By Enyinnaya Appolos
The dream of an Igbo presidency in Nigeria’s Second Republic suffered a major blow in 1983, not merely due to electoral defeat, but because of a sophisticated, emotionally charged campaign that weaponized the ghost of Biafra against one of Nigeria’s most iconic nationalists, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.
The events leading up to the 1983 elections reveal how post-war resentment, political opportunism, and internal Igbo contradictions were skillfully exploited by the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN), led by President Shehu Shagari, with the help of Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the former Biafran warlord, to suppress the chances of Zik’s party, the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), and by extension, the broader Igbo presidency project.
Following the civil war (1967–1970), Nigeria restructured itself politically. By the 1979 general elections, five political parties had been officially registered, largely reflecting ethnic and regional allegiances. The NPN, led by Shehu Shagari, was strongest in the North and parts of the Middle Belt. The UPN, under Chief Obafemi Awolowo, dominated the Yoruba Southwest. The NPP, under Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, was rooted in the Southeast (Igbo heartland), parts of the Middle Belt, and parts of Rivers State. The PRP and GNPP had influence primarily in Northern regions.
In 1979, after the collapse of efforts to form a national coalition, Zik’s NPP entered into an alliance with the NPN. Part of the agreement included nominating Dr. Alex Ekwueme as Shagari’s running mate, a move that helped the NPN secure critical votes in the East and win the presidency. In return, the NPP won the governorships of Anambra, Imo, and Plateau States and received ministerial and other appointments in the federal government.
However, before the 1983 elections, the NPN-NPP alliance collapsed. Zik reemerged as the NPP presidential candidate, directly challenging Shagari. With Awolowo of the UPN also in the race, the Southeast became a key battleground.
One of the most politically significant moves ahead of the election was President Shagari’s decision to grant a presidential pardon to Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who had been in exile in Côte d’Ivoire since the war’s end in 1970.
Ojukwu’s return in 1982 was not merely symbolic, it was strategic. Instead of aligning with fellow Igbo leaders in the NPP, Ojukwu shocked many by joining the NPN, the same party that can be said to have led the federal war effort against Biafra. For many, this was ironic. For Ojukwu, it was personal.
A central narrative pushed by Ojukwu’s camp was that Zik had betrayed Biafra, despite Zik’s role as a supporter and international spokesman during the conflict. In truth, Zik called for a ceasefire and reconciliation because he prioritized human lives and the long-term survival of the Igbo. At the time, federal troops were closing in on remaining Biafran strongholds, and Zik believed that continued warfare would bring irreversible harm to the Igbo. In August 1969, he publicly called for a ceasefire, arguing that dialogue, not bullets, offered the best hope for the future.
Ojukwu was well aware of the deteriorating situation that provoked Zik’s call. He knew the war had turned decisively against Biafra. Still, he believed Zik’s position undermined Biafran leadership and morale. Eventually, on January 9, 1970, Ojukwu handed over power to his deputy, Major General Philip Effiong, and fled to Côte d’Ivoire, where he was granted asylum by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny.
Back on the national stage, Ojukwu sought to settle old scores. He was handed the NPN senatorial ticket for Anambra State and actively campaigned against Zik and the NPP across Igbo land, with support from figures like Dr. Chuba Okadigbo, who was then Political Adviser to President Shagari.
Recall that it was during this period, specifically in 1981, as preparations for the 1983 elections intensified, that Okadigbo made his infamous remark dismissing Zik’s criticisms of the Shagari administration’s electoral misconduct as “the ranting of an ant.”
Okadigbo’s insult was widely condemned. Zik, deeply offended by such a condescending portrayal, reportedly issued a powerful and prophetic rebuttal. Among the most oft-quoted lines from his response:
“My boy, may you live to your full potential… ascend to dizzy heights… be acknowledged worldwide. But then, if it is not the tradition of our people that elders are roundly insulted, as you have unjustly done to me, may your reign come to an abrupt and shattering close… may the crown fall off your head, and your political head off your shoulders… you will be hounded, humiliated, and disgraced out of office, your credibility and your name in tatters forever.”
The most potent tool in the NPN’s arsenal against Zik was the propaganda narrative of betrayal, that Zik had abandoned Biafra and compromised Igbo self-determination. This struck an emotional chord among younger voters, war survivors, and ex-Biafran loyalists disillusioned with the NPP’s moderate approach.
While Zik remained revered as a founding father, the propaganda reframed him as outdated, out of touch with post-war realities. Ojukwu, meanwhile, was elevated as the true defender of Igbo pride, even while aligning with the same federal forces he had once fought.
The 1983 election results in the Southeast reflected the effectiveness of this campaign. Zik lost the presidential election, even in his strongholds of Anambra and Imo. Jim Nwobodo, the NPP governor of Anambra, lost his re-election bid to Christian Onoh of the NPN. Only Samuel Mbakwe of Imo retained his seat, defeating Chief Collins Obih of the NPN. Ironically, Ojukwu himself lost his senatorial race to Dr. Edwin Onwudiwe of the NPP, showing that while he was a potent symbol, his personal political capital remained limited.
Still, the damage was done. The 1983 elections marked the collapse of the NPP’s dominance in the Southeast and a major setback for the Igbo presidential project.
In hindsight, Shagari’s NPN had masterfully turned the Igbo political space against itself. By co-opting Ojukwu and weaponizing Biafra-era emotions, the party fractured Igbo unity at a moment when the Southeast had a real opportunity to produce a Nigerian president in Azikiwe.
Ojukwu, driven by personal grievances, became the rallying point of anti-Zik sentiment. Rather than heal old wounds, his return reopened them, and Igbo aspirations were sacrificed on the altar of internal division.
The 1983 election was not just another political contest; it marked a defining moment in the post-Biafra identity crisis of the Igbo people. It exposed unresolved traumas and revealed how historical wounds, left untreated, can be exploited for short-term political gain.
In this environment, Zik’s towering legacy, as a symbol of unity, pan-Africanism, and political sophistication, was tainted. His pragmatic engagement through the NPP was reframed as betrayal. His moral authority was challenged from within. Instead of consolidating power, the Southeast fragmented, losing both political influence and moral clarity in national discourse.
Since then, no Igbo leader has matched Zik’s stature. Many have tried, some with noble intentions, others for personal gain, but none has unified the region or articulated a coherent political strategy for Igbo advancement. The legacy of 1983 remains a cautionary tale: of what happens when unity is compromised, leadership is consumed by rivalry, and history is manipulated instead of healed.
Zik, the father of Nigerian nationalism, found his legacy undermined not by colonialists or rival regions, but by a narrative of betrayal that emerged from within. Fueled by post-Biafra sentiment and championed by Ojukwu and others, it overshadowed Zik’s lifelong commitment to a united Nigeria and the Igbo role in it.
While Ojukwu may have sought redemption and regional leadership, his alignment with the NPN and attack on Zik fractured what was left of the Igbo political consensus. In doing so, he inadvertently hastened the collapse of a viable Igbo-led political front, a collapse that continues to echo in the region’s diminished influence in national politics.
In the end, the propaganda worked. Zik and the NPP were weakened at the polls. The NPN, with Ojukwu as a controversial ally, made significant inroads into a once-unified Southeast. But the victory came at great cost. The campaign did not just defeat a party, it fractured a region, deepened internal distrust, and left the Southeast more divided and politically vulnerable than ever. What had once been a relatively united political front under Zik was now splintered by mistrust, competing loyalties, and unresolved historical pain.
The collapse of Igbo political unity, which became evident in 1983, persisted into 2003 when Ojukwu contested for the presidency of Nigeria under the platform of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), another Igbo-based party in the Fourth Republic. It was his most prominent national political attempt following his senatorial defeat in 1983.
Ironically, Ojukwu experienced the same sense of betrayal he once contributed to. Major Igbo political figures were aligned with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and actively campaigned for the re-election of General Olusegun Obasanjo, opposing Ojukwu’s presidential bid.
The aspiration for a Nigerian president of Igbo extraction is not only justified but long overdue. Yet, this dream continues to slip away, not because of external resistance alone, but due to internal divisions, political betrayals, and the relentless pursuit of personal ambition among the Igbo elite. Until unity is forged and collective interest prioritized over individual gain, the path to the presidency may remain just that, a dream deferred.
History teaches us to avoid past mistakes. Using the same method to solve a problem will only produce the same outcome.
Igbo ronu!
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